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COMMENTS
PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN THE POST-ENRON
ERA: THE DUTY TO WARN AND THE CASE FOR
ABOLISHING THE GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT
TEST
Peter N. Downing+
The fall of Enron' fundamentally changed the federal government's
approach to corporate criminal law enforcement and ushered in an era of
increased governmental oversight of corporate America. 2 With the creation ofthe Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2002,3 President George W. Bush
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professor Stephen Goldman for his mentorship and advice.
1. See, e.g., John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 58 n.4 (2005) (noting that on December 2, 2001, Enron
filed for Chapter II bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York); James K. Glassman, Diversify, Diversify, Diversify, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at
A10 (reporting that Enron's stock price had dropped to nearly zero dollars per share from a high
of eighty-four dollars per share).
2. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 275 (2004)
(discussing that the collapse of Enron brought about a "sea change" in corporate criminal law
enforcement and led the government to take a more aggressive approach to corporate
wrongdoing); see also Stephen A. Jonas & Jonathan A. Shapiro, Parallel Prosecutions and Their
Collateral Consequences, CHIEF LEGAL EXECUTIVE, Winter 2004, at 42 (explaining that Stephen
Cutler, Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Division of Enforcement,
said "it's a whole new ball game" in the securities law enforcement community since the collapse
of various companies, including Enron). Although federal and state prosecutors have begun
investigations of possible wrongdoing related to the current decline of financial markets, this
Comment does not specifically address these issues. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Joint U.S-New York
Inquiry into Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at B4 (Bajaj reported that "New
York State and federal prosecutors are investigating trading in credit-default swaps ....
Prosecutors are looking at whether traders manipulated the largely unregulated market for credit-
default swaps .... ").
3. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003) (establishing the Corporate Fraud
Task Force); see also Jody M. Arogeti, Note, How Much Cooperation Between Government
Agencies Is Too Much?: Reconciling United States v. Scrushy, the Corporate Fraud Task Force,
and the Nature of Parallel Proceedings, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 427 (2006) (stating that the
Bush Administration "promise[d] to wage an aggressive fight against corporate fraud and
abuse[,]" and that the Corporate Fraud Task Force was one of the principal means of elevating
oversight of corporate America); Carrie Johnson, Executives Spend Lavishly on Defense: In
Corporate Cases, a Wealth of Resources, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at El (noting that after the
fall of Enron, President Bush established the Corporate Fraud Task Force and U.S. Attorneys
offices throughout the country secured funding to hire additional attorneys).
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emphasized the need for greater coordination between federal prosecutors and
civil enforcement agencies. 4 Since then, the government has increasingly used
simultaneous or successive civil and criminal proceedings, also known as
parallel proceedings, 5 as a strategy to efficiently and effectively bring criminal
indictments against corporations and their officers.
6
Parallel proceedings are one or more civil and criminal proceeding arising
out of a single transaction against the same defendant. 7  Neither civil nor
4. See Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Marks
Five Years of Ensuring Corporate Integrity, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/07_odag_
507.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (stating that the purpose of the Corporate Fraud Task Force
is to coordinate investigations and prosecution of financial crimes, make recommendations for
allocating resources among various agencies, and facilitate cooperation across agencies involved
in the investigation and prosecution). Cooperation among agencies increased dramatically in the
wake of Enron's collapse. See Jonas & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 42. Prior to the collapse of
various companies, the SEC had to virtually "cajol[e]" federal prosecutors into taking securities
cases; however, after the company's downfall, the SEC and U.S. Attorneys now coordinate on
parallel criminal and civil enforcement proceedings. Id.
5. See Mark D. Hunter, SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings: Contemplating the Propriety of
Recent Judicial Trends, 68 Mo. L. REV. 149, 176 (2003) (discussing that parallel proceedings
have become a valuable tool for the government since the creation of the Corporate Fraud Task
Force); David H. Kistenbroker et al., Criminal and Civil Investigations: United States v. Stein
and Related Issues, 1574 PLI/CoRP. 401, 405 (2006) (explaining that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
gave the SEC significantly more power to carry out its corporate oversight functions, and at the
same time, "the [DOJ] began ramping up its financial crimes prosecutions, often in tandem with
those pursued by the SEC"); see also Richard C. Smith, Parallel Proceedings Put Certain Rights
at Risk: Defendant's Can't Always Count on Constitutional Rights in Such Situations, NAT'L L.J.,
July 24, 2006, at S2 (noting a recent spike in the number of parallel proceedings against corporate
officers brought by the DOJ and the SEC); Richard M. Strassberg et al., Navigating Parallel
Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 2006, at 9 (noting that in the post-Enron era, the government is
more frequently coordinating civil and criminal cases).
6. See Brickey, supra note 2, at 275 (indicating that the government initiated
"unprecedented numbers of major fraud cases in a record period of time" following Enron's
collapse); Department of Justice, Corporate Fraud Task Force: Significant Criminal Cases and
Charging Documents, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftflcases.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) ("The
President's Corporate Fraud Task Force has enjoyed tremendous success in bringing 'real time,'
decisive criminal and civil enforcement action against those who have traded on their positions of
trust to defraud their investors, their employees and the public."). Compare Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty at the
Corporate Fraud Task Force Fifth Anniversary Event (July 17, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2007/dagspeech_070717.html) (indicating that since
2002, the government has obtained 1236 corporate fraud convictions, including 214 chief
executive officers and 129 vice-presidents), with Jonas & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 42-43 (stating
that in 1999 there were just sixty-four indictments of corporate executives).
7. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 149 (noting that while the term "parallel proceeding"
frequently refers to joint civil and criminal proceedings, it also encompasses a wide array of
actions including any "investigations by any federal regulatory agency, civil injunctive or penalty
actions, administrative disciplinary proceedings, cease and desist proceedings, private action[] ...
proceedings by self-regulatory agencies, various state proceedings, grand jury inquiries, and/or
criminal prosecutions"); see also Randy S. Eckers, Note, Unjust Justice in Parallel Proceedings:
Preventing Circumvention of Criminal Discovery Rules, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 109 (1998)
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criminal procedures 8 specifically address situations that are unique to parallel
proceedings, 9 such as whether evidence, statements, or admissions provided in
one forum may be used in the other.'0 As a result, a defendant in a parallel
proceeding may find himself faced with a uniquely difficult choice: whether to
make disclosures in one proceeding that potentially could be self-incriminating
in a parallel proceeding.11 Thus, a defendant in a civil case may have to
choose from the lesser of three evils: asserting his Fifth Amendment right
(providing that the key feature of a parallel proceeding is involvement of substantially the same
parties and the same matter); Georgia A. Staton & Renee J. Scatena, Parallel Proceedings: A
Discovery Minefield, 34 ARIZ. ATr'Y 17, 17 (1998) (indicating that a parallel proceeding may
include simultaneous discovery in both the civil and criminal proceedings).
8. See, e.g., Staton & Scatena, supra note 7, at 17 (noting the sharp distinction between
discovery rules for civil and criminal litigation); Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal
Proceedings, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1277 & n.1 (1967) [hereinafter Concurrent Civil and
Criminal Proceedings] (explaining that the criminal process is "fundamentally unlike" the civil
process because of the requirement that the prosecution prove the government's case beyond a
reasonable doubt, the emphasis on constitutional protections for the accused, and distinctly
different procedural rules).
9. See Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions,
98 HARv. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1985) [hereinafter Equitable Powers] (describing that the
prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt without assistance of the accused,
whereas civil procedure rejects the strict and narrow discovery guidelines of criminal procedure
because such obstacles would interfere with the "search for truth"). Compare FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(b)(2) (establishing a criminal process in which the government must prove its case without
relying on assistance from the accused), with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (establishing civil
procedures that afford litigants broad discovery of any matter not privileged).
10. See Staton & Scatena, supra note 7, at 17 (indicating that the federal and criminal
procedure rules provide neither answers nor guidance as to how much information gained in a
criminal trial may be used in a civil case, when a defendant may assert his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination in a civil case, and when one action should be stayed to avoid prejudice
to a defendant); see also Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, supra note 8, at 1277
(noting that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege is often preserved during a parallel
proceeding at the expense of civil discovery); Equitable Powers, supra note 9, at 1024
(discussing that the civil process elevates the importance of "the search for truth" over the
protection of parties to the proceeding, whereas a criminal action emphasizes protections for the
defendant by retaining an adversarial format).
11. See Equitable Powers, supra note 9, at 1024 (discussing that the most serious conflict
caused by a parallel proceeding arises when a defendant is forced to choose between his Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination and disclosing evidence necessary to secure a just
resolution of his civil claim); see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2251, at 316 (John T. McNaughton rev., 1961) (describing that harmful
disclosure, contempt, or perjury are the "three homs of the triceratops" that defendants face).
Even taking the Fifth in a parallel civil proceeding has risks because the opposing side may draw
negative inferences from the defendant's silence. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318
(1976) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil
actions when they refuse to testify .... "); LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 390
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the trier of fact may draw negative inferences from a defendant's
silence).
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against self incrimination and risking negative inferences;1 2 making self-
incriminating disclosures;13 or refusing to comply with the court's discovery
orders and risk being found in contempt of court.
The courts and Congress have encouraged the use of parallel proceedings as
an efficient means of law enforcement. 15 But many critics, including targets of
parallel proceedings, argue that the government's coordinated tactics are unfair
and unconstitutional. The leading Supreme Court case on parallel
proceedings, United States v. Kordel, established that parallel proceedings are
17not inherently unconstitutional, but suggested that a defendant's due process
12. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Eckers, supra note 7, at 130 (calling the defendant's choice between asserting the Fifth
Amendment and exposing incriminating evidence a "double-edged sword").
14. See, e.g., Hanley v. James McHugh Constr. Co., 419 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1969)
(noting that the defendant was found guilty of contempt for failing to comply with a court's
discovery order).
15. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000) (providing that the
SEC "may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the
Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under
this subchapter"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2000) (using
virtually identical language); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(d) (providing
for cooperation among governmental branches by requiring the Attorney General to consult with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade
Representative, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury); accord SEC v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (indicating that in passing the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, the Congress expressed approval for close coordination between the DOJ and the
SEC). The Senate Report to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act stated that "[t]he committee
expects that close cooperation will develop between the SEC and the Justice Department at the
earliest stage of any investigation in order to insure [sic] that the evidence needed for a criminal
prosecution does not become stale." S. REP. No. 95-114, at 12 (1977). The House echoed a
similar sentiment: "Traditionally, there has been a close working relationship between the Justice
Department and the SEC. The Committee fully expects that this cooperation between the two
agencies will continue with respect to the enforcement of the provisions of this bill." H.R. REP.
No. 95-640, at 10 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Kistenbroker, supra note 5, at 440-41 (arguing that increased latitude provided
to the SEC and the DOJ "often resulted in corner-cutting and served the near-term ends of those
agencies rather than the larger policy goals envisioned by Congress" while failing to provide
greater protection to the investing public); Smith, supra note 5 (suggesting that recent federal
court decisions criticizing the government's coordination in parallel proceedings may suggest a
trend toward increased scrutiny of parallel proceedings); Hunter, supra note 5, at 175 & n. 195
(citing American Bar Association Resolution, adopted by the House of Delegates, Report No.
108B (Feb. 8-9, 1993)) (expressing concerns about the rights of defendants in parallel
proceedings and urging Congress to enact statutory and procedural changes to protect defendants
in parallel proceedings).
17. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (holding that it would "stultify
enforcement of federal law" to adopt a rule forcing the government to choose between civil
litigation or criminal prosecution); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52
(1912) (holding that there is no per se rule against parallel proceedings); see also SEC v. First
Fin. Group, 659 F.2d 660, 666 (5th Cir. 1981) ("There is no general federal constitutional,
statutory, or common law rule barring the simultaneous prosecution of separate civil and criminal
[Vol. 58:199
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rights prescribe limits on the government's use of parallel proceedings.,
8
However, Kordel's formulation of what constitutes due process in parallel
proceedings has failed to produce consistent case law among the federal
courts. 1
9
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court's singular decision was too
vague and that the federal courts should adopt a more functional standard
based on the government's duty to warn and a defendant's underlying
constitutional rights. Part I reviews the historical roots of the federal courts'
authority to oversee parallel proceedings, the Supreme Court's early
jurisprudence on the issue, and the Court's decision in Kordel. This Part
discusses two common applications of the Kordel decision: those cases
decided based on the adequacy of the waming given to a defendant, and those
cases decided based on the court's understanding of government misconduct.
Part II analyzes the standards courts use to evaluate the propriety of parallel
proceedings. First, this Part examines cases upholding or dismissing parallel
proceedings based on the government's duty to warn a target of a parallel
proceeding. Second, this Part discusses courts that have dismissed parallel
proceedings under the Fourth Amendment due to affirmative
misrepresentations by the government, but have also held that the failure to
warn can never be the sole basis for a Fourth Amendment violation. Last, this
Part suggests that a series of recent decisions in the First, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits provide the basis for rejecting the government misconduct test
altogether and refining the application of the due process approach.
Finally, Part III argues that review of a parallel proceeding should
encompass both a Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis. This analysis begins
with the question of whether or not the government has engaged in affirmative
misrepresentations. Next, it calls on the court to examine whether the
defendant received adequate warning. Finally, this Comment suggests that the
federal courts should discard the government misconduct test because no such
standard exists under either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.
actions by different federal agencies against the same defendant involving the same
transactions."); Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d at 1374 (stating that parallel proceedings are
unobjectionable).
18. SeeKordel,397U.S.atll-12.
19. See Christian Babich, Comment, Parallel Proceedings: The Government's Double-
Team Approach and the Degradation of Constitutional Protections, II LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
753, 771 (2007) ("Thirty-six years after Kordel, the crux of the debate concerning the
constitutionality of parallel investigations still centers on what constitutes deceptive practices on
the part of the government."); see also United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137
(N.D. Ala. 2005) (noting the lack of clear case law distinguishing a legitimate parallel proceeding
from an improper one); Eli Ewing, Comment, Too Close for Comfort: United States v. Stringer
and United States v. Scrushy Impose a Stricter Standard on SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings, 25
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217, 222 (2006) ("Courts have yet to develop a clear standard that
describe[s] bad faith civil discovery in parallel proceedings.").
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN APPROACH TO PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
A. The Creation of Judicial Discretion for Review of Parallel Proceedings
The authority of the courts to police parallel proceedings evolved from a
1912 United States Supreme Court case, Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co.
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court reviewed the government's suit
to enjoin the defendant for antitrust violations under the Sherman Act.20 The
Court upheld the government's right to bring simultaneous or successive suits
against a single defendant for violations arising out of the same statute,21 and
acknowledged that the government may determine when and how to bring the
parallel proceeding.
22
The Court refrained from establishing a bright line rule against parallel
proceedings, recognizing that the Court's review is limited when a statute
provides the 2 overnment with the authority to carry out both criminal and civil
proceedings. However, Standard Sanitary left open the possibility that a
court may be justified in intervening in parallel proceedings when such action
24is necessary to prevent injury to one of the parties. The Court provided that
the decision to intervene should be discretionary, 25 and courts should consider
the circumstances and interests of both parties before exercising that
discretion.
26
In 1956, in McNabb v. United States, the Supreme Court took an additional
step in formally establishing judicial oversight of parallel proceedings by
creating the concept of "supervisory authority." 27 This authority was intended
20. Standard Sanitary Mfg., 226 U.S. at 34-35 (reviewing the government's allegations that
defendants had violated the Sherman Act by "enter[ing] into and engag[ing] in a combination and
conspiracy to restrain such trade and commerce").
21. Id. at 51-52 ("The Sherman Act provides for a criminal proceeding to punish violations
and suits in equity to restrain such violations, and the suits may be brought simultaneously or
successively.").
22. Id. at 52 (holding that the government determines whether to bring the suits and the
order in which the suits are brought).
23. Id. (discussing that the question at hand is the "extent of the court's discretion" where
"[tihe Sherman Act provides for a criminal proceeding to punish violations and suits in equity to
restrain such violations, and the suits may be brought simultaneously or successively").
24. Id. (noting that based on the facts at hand, the Court found no need to interfere with the
government's choice to bring parallel proceedings).
25. Id.
26. Id; see also Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (explaining that a
decision to stay parallel proceedings requires the courts to "weigh competing interests and
maintain an even balance").
27. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (emphasizing that the admissibility
of evidence in a federal criminal case is governed not only by the Constitution, but also by the
Court's use of "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts").
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to ensure that all parties adhered to procedural requirements set by the court,
2 8
29
and specifically to oversee the use of prosecutorial powers by federal agents.
Over time, supervisory authority gained acceptance among the federal courts
as an equitable tool to remedy a violation of rights, preserve judicial integrity,
and deter illegal conduct. 30 Nonetheless, there were limits on a court's ability
to invoke its supervisory authority; namely, courts were precluded from using
supervisory authority as a remedy for harmless errors or as a means of
deterring inappropriate prosecutorial behavior.
32
B. Disagreement Grows Among Courts Regarding Standards for Reviewing
Parallel Proceedings
While the advent of supervisory authority gave the courts a basic mechanism
to oversee parallel proceedings,3 3 this authority failed to harmonize the federal
courts' approach to parallel proceedings. 34 For example, two federal district
28. See Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J.
1050, 1050 (1965) [hereinafter Judge-Made Supervisory Power] (discussing that the supervisory
authority is a relatively modem concept first arising in McNabb); see also United States v.
Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 806 (1983)
(attributing McNabb as the original case invoking the notion of supervisory authority and noting
that this equitable power was unique in that it rested on neither constitutional nor statutory
grounds).
29. See, e.g., Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956) (noting that the Supreme Court
had prescribed the federal rules of searches and seizure and that "[t]he power of the federal courts
extends to policing those requirements and making certain that they are observed").
30. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) ("The purposes underlying use
of the supervisory powers are threefold: to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights;
to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations
validly before the jury; and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct." (citations
omitted)); see also Judge-Made Supervisory Power, supra note 28, at 1050 (characterizing the
supervisory authority as an instrument "to maintain and develop standards of fair play in the
federal courts more exacting than the minimum constitutional requirements of due process").
31. See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 506 (noting that a judicial remedy is unnecessary when the
court is presented with harmless error because the conviction would have been successful
regardless of the asserted error). The error is harmless when there is no "'reasonable possibility
that the [practice] complained of might have contributed to the conviction."' Id. (quoting Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)) (alteration in original).
32. See id. ("[D]eterrence is an inappropriate basis for reversal . . . where means more
narrowly tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are available."). The Court held
that the supervisory authority over conviction reversals should be used cautiously and with an eye
toward balancing the parties' interests. Id. at 506-07. The authority is reserved for cases in
which "there is a clear basis in fact and law for doing so." United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d
535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983).
33. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (suggesting that the Court would be
entitled to use its supervisory authority if the parallel proceedings proved to be a violation of due
process or "a departure from proper standards in the administration ofjustice").
34. Compare United States v. Parrott (Parrott 1), 248 F. Supp. 196, 199 (D.D.C. 1965)
(holding that the government is required to provide more than basic notification of a defendant's
constitutional rights when a parallel criminal proceeding is imminent), with United States v.
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courts confronted with similar situations reached contradictory conclusions
within four years of each other.
35
In United States v. Parrott (Parrott 1), a 1965 decision from the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, the defendant sought to
dismiss a criminal indictment 36 on the grounds that the government did not
properly notify him of the existence of a criminal investigation. 37 In the course
of an SEC civil enforcement action against the defendant, 38 the agency
informed the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia that the
defendant may have also violated criminal provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act.39 During an SEC administrative hearing, the agency informed
the defendant of his constitutional rights but stated that "[t]he Division has not
instituted any criminal proceedings against any of [the defendants]. 4° The
court held that the government must do more than merely inform a defendant
of his constitutional rights when a parallel criminal action is imminent.41 The
court explained that the government was required to specifically warn a
defendant that the SEC had referred the matter to DOJ criminal investigators42
and that a failure to do so was grounds for dismissal of the indictment.
43
Contrary to Parrott I, the Southern District of New York, in United States v.
Parrott (Parrott II), held that defendants received constitutionally sufficient
warnings when the government advised the defendants of their Fifth
Parrott (Parrott 11), 315 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that the government has
no further duty to warn a defendant of potential additional prosecutions once defendant has been
notified of his constitutional rights).
35. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 151 (observing that Parrott I and Parrott II are prime
examples of courts reaching opposite conclusions under similar circumstances).
36. Parrott 1, 248 F. Supp. at 198-99 (detailing the defendant's initial involvement in two
civil SEC proceedings for the sale of the defendant's corporate stock in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act, and the SEC's subsequent referral of the matter to the United States Attorney for
criminal prosecution).
37. Id. at 199 (noting that government counsel attended the SEC proceedings, "purposefully
conceal[ing]" their identities, while the SEC attorney denied that criminal proceedings had been
initiated against the defendants).
38. Id. at 198. The SEC sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and
permanent injunction against the defendant for possible violations of the Securities and Exchange
Act relating to the sale of the defendant's corporate stock. Id
39. Id. at 199.
40. Id. at 207. The court characterized this statement as a "deni[al] that criminal
proceedings had been instituted against any of the persons involved." Id at 199.
41. Id. at 199-200 (explaining that the issue before the court was whether the government
may bring a parallel proceeding to avail itself of the benefits of civil discovery and then use that
information in a criminal case). The court focused on whether the defendant was sufficiently
aware of the criminal case so that he could properly prevent any self-incriminating evidence from
disclosure at the civil proceeding. Id. at 199-200.
42. Id. (highlighting that the government failed to specifically warn the defendant that the
matter had been referred to the United States Attorney's office). However, the court noted that
the defendant received general warnings during at least some of the proceedings. Id. at 199.
43. Id. at 201-02.
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Amendment rights against self-incrimination while the defendants were
represented by counsel in a civil proceeding. 44  The court held that a
constitutionally sufficient warning is all that is required and that the
government discharged that duty when it advised the defendants of their Fifth
Amendment rights. 45 Specifically, the court stated that "[t]here was no duty
upon the government, once having advised the defendants of their right against
self-incrimination, to warn them that as the investigation proceeded it might
warrant presentation to a grand jury and prosecution upon criminal charges. ' 46
A more detailed warning was unnecessary 47 because it would be impractical,
burdensome, and even meaningless to require the government to keep a
defendant constantly advised about the government's plans regarding a
48
criminal investigation.
C. Kordel: the Supreme Court Establishes the Due Process Standard but
Leaves Other Options Open
In United States v. Kordel, decided nearly sixty years after Standard
Sanitary, the Supreme Court issued its most direct ruling on parallel
proceedings.49 Detroit Vital Foods, Inc. and several of its executives were
convicted in federal district court for criminal violations of the Federal Food,
44. See United States v. Parrott (Parrott I1), 315 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(noting that the civil suit against the defendants provided adequate notice of the defendants'
potentially criminal wrongdoing). The case arose because the defendants motioned to dismiss
alleged securities violations. Id. at 1013.
45. Id. at 1015 (rejecting the defendants' characterization of the warning and finding that
the government specifically advised the defendants of their Fifth Amendment rights against self
incrimination, while the defendants were represented by counsel). Once the government had
advised the defendants that they had a constitutional right against self-incrimination the
government had fulfilled its duty to warn. Id.
46. Id. at 1015. The court drew on an analogous case, United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. 1959), in which the Second Circuit suggested that a civil tax investigation inherently
suggests the possibility of a criminal action. Parrot 11, 315 F. Supp. at 1015-16. The Sclafani
court stated:
A "routine" tax investigation openly commenced as such is devoid of stealth or
deceit because the ordinary taxpayer surely knows that there is inherent in it a warning
that the government's agents will pursue evidence of misreporting without regard to the
shadowy line between avoidance and evasion, mistake and willful omission.
Sclafani, 265 F.2d at 414-15.
47. Parrott 11, 315 F. Supp. at 1015 (holding that the government was not required to
confirm whether the SEC investigation would warrant subsequent criminal charges).
48. Id. at 1016 ("[I]t is unrealistic to suggest that the government could or should keep a
taxpayer advised as to the direction in which its necessarily fluctuating investigations lead."
(quoting Sclafani, 265 F.2d at 415)).
49. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (referring to Standard Sanitary for the
proposition that the government need not wait until the conclusion of a civil proceeding to initiate
a criminal case); see also Hunter, supra note 5, at 152 (noting that Kordel revisited the Supreme
Court's initial holding and rationale in Standard Sanitary).
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Drug, and Cosmetics Act.50  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
obtained interrogatories from a parallel civil proceeding, which were then used
in the government's criminal prosecution. 5' The executives argued that it was
a violation of their Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination for the government to use interrogatories obtained in the civil
action in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 52 Alternatively, the executives
urged the court to dismiss the parallel proceedings on the grounds that "the
Government's conduct ... reflected such unfairness and want of consideration
for justice as independently to require the reversal of their convictions. '" 53
Examining the Fifth Amendment allegations, the Kordel Court explained
that a defendant who was aware of the risk that the government might bring a
parallel criminal action had ample opportunity to assert his Fifth Amendment
rights.54 The Court concluded that the defendant did not suffer a Fifth
Amendment violation because the defendant was notified of his Fifth
Amendment rights.55 Importantly, the FDA complied with its statutory duty to
warn the defendant that he was a possible target of a parallel criminal
investigation.
56
The Court then addressed the defendants' due process argument.57 The
Court plainly stated that it would not interfere with the government's choice to
bring parallel criminal or civil proceedings unless the accused could
demonstrate a due process violation or a "departure from the proper standards
in the administration of criminal justice. '5 8 The Court found nothing improper
about the FDA's decision to proceed with a civil enforcement action while
continuing a criminal investigation. 59 In fact, the Court recognized that civil
enforcement agencies would be severely hampered if they were forced to
50. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 2.
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. Id. at 2-3.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 7-8 (discussing that the defendant could have invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege in the civil proceeding to prevent self-incrimination in the criminal proceeding).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4 (finding that the FDA fulfilled its statutory duty to warn). The FDA statute
stated: "Before any violation of [the Act] ... is reported ... to any United States attorney for
institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding is contemplated
shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity [to respond] ...... 21 U.S.C. § 335 (2000).
57. See Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11.
58. Id. at 13. The Court acknowledged that the government may not use evidence that was
coerced from a defendant against the defendant in a criminal case, but found that the record in
Kordel reflected no such coercion. Id. Absent such a constitutional or procedural violation, the
Court held that Standard Sanitary still stands as good law for the proposition that the government
need not choose between a civil or criminal proceeding. Id. at 11.
59. Id. (explaining that the need to protect consumers from misbranded drugs was a
compelling reason for the FDA to take enforcement actions).
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choose between initiating a civil action or recommending criminal
prosecution.
60
The Court then noted, in what has been described as dicta, 6 1 that it may have
reached an alternative conclusion had the circumstances been different. 2 The
Court recited five categories of special circumstances under which a court
would be justified in dismissing a. parallel proceeding, 63 but provided little
explanation about the significance or rationale for listing those five
circumstances.
64
The first circumstance provided that dismissal of a parallel proceeding may
be justified if "the Government .. .brought a civil action solely to obtain
evidence for its criminal prosecution." 65 Some of the cases cited by the Court
suggested that a civil action would beXroper when the government adhered to
the relevant procedural requirements. However, the Court also cited cases
that indicated that the courts must go a step further and examine when and why
the government decided to institute the parallel proceeding.
67
60. Id.
61. See United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing the
circumstances in Kordel as dicta); see also Ewing, supra note 19, at 220-21 (noting that the
circumstances in Kordel were unessential to the Court's holding). But see Hunter, supra note 5,
at 152-53 (describing these circumstances as a more central part of the Kordel decision).
62. SeeKordel,397U.S.at 11-12.
63. Id. Circumstances may warrant a remedy where:
[1] the Government has brought a civil action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal
prosecution[;] ... [2 the Government] has failed to advise the defendant in its civil
proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution; .. . [3] the defendant is
without counsel[;] [4 the defendant] reasonably fears prejudice from adverse pretrial
publicity or other unfair injury; [or] ... [5] any other special circumstances that might
suggest the unconstitutionality or even the impropriety ofth[e] criminal prosecution.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. See id at 12 n.23-27 (citing various cases across jurisdictions as support for the Court's
enumerated test without explanation about the rationales or holdings of those cases); see also
Ewing, supra note 19, at 220-21 (noting that the special circumstances listed failed to set forth a
doctrinal test that would signify when it would be improper to use evidence from a civil
proceeding in a criminal proceeding).
65. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11-12.
66. See id. at 12 n.23 (citing Procter & Gamble based on its proposition that when the
government properly observes the rules of criminal procedure, the defendant has no claim that the
criminal proceeding was used to "short-cut" discovery in the civil action (citing United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1958))). In Procter & Gamble, the Court
prevented a defendant in a civil action from gaining access to a grand jury transcript on the
grounds that production of the grand jury transcript would be justified only if criminal procedure
was violated. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1958).
67. See Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12 n.23 (citing United States v. Pennsalt Chemicals Corp., 260
F. Supp. 171, 181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929, 931-32 (D.
Colo. 1963)). Pennsalt suggested that the impropriety of a parallel proceeding depended on: (1)
when the government decided to initiate the grand jury investigation; (2) when the government
decide to seek an indictment; (3) when the government decided to institute a civil action against
the defendants; and (4) when the government decided to terminate its criminal proceeding.
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Under the second circumstance, a parallel proceeding may be dismissed if
the government failed to adequately warn the defendant that the government
was contemplating a criminal action. 6 8 Specifically, a warning is insufficient if
a defendant has not been advised of his constitutional rights prior to divulging
information to the government.69 The government's warning, however, need
not conclusively indicate whether a criminal prosecution would necessarily
follow.
70
Third, a parallel proceeding may be improper where a defendant lacked legal
counsel and was not advised of his right to be represented. 71 Fourth, it may be
improper to allow parallel proceedings where one party reasonably fears that
publicity from one 'proceeding will have an adverse or prejudicial effect on
another proceeding.72 Fifth, and finally, the Court stated that there might be
"other special circumstances" where a court might find a parallel criminal
proceeding unconstitutional or even improper.73 As such, civil proceedings
may be deferred at the request of the prosecution or the defense when the
interests ofjustice require.74
The list in Kordel was not meant to be exhaustive.75 Although the Court
ruled that the parallel proceedings at issue were unobjectionable, the Court's
holding did not provide a doctrinal test for evaluating the permissibility of
parallel proceedings. 76  The ambiguity of the five special circumstances
United States v. Pennsalt Chemicals Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171, 181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Thayer
held that because the SEC was considering a criminal perjury prosecution when it deposed the
accused, there was a suggestion of improper conduct. Thayer, 214 F. Supp. at 931-32.
68. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12.
69. See id. at 12 n.24 (citing Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
which dismissed a criminal prosecution when an IRS agent conducted a lengthy interview without
first apprising the defendant of his constitutional rights; United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp.
519, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), which noted that the government obtained evidence from a defendant
without obtaining his consent; and United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126, 128 (E.D. Pa.
1953), which noted that "[a]t no time was defendant warned either by [the IRS] of his
constitutional right not to testify against himself nor was he warned that anything he said or any
information he disclosed to them might be used against him in a criminal proceeding.").
70. See id. at 4 n.5 (noting that the government was required by statute to warn defendants
that information obtained in a civil investigation could be shared with "any United States
attorney," but that receipt of the warning "did not necessarily mean that a criminal prosecution
would follow").
71. Id. at 12 n.25 (citing Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1953))
(finding that the defendant had not been properly advised of his right to counsel where defendant
appeared before a Congressional Committee under a subpoena and was without counsel).
72. Id. at 12.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 153 (noting that the list of circumstances described in
Kordel was incomplete and left practitioners with many questions regarding what other factual
situations constituted 'special circumstances"').
76. See Ewing, supra note 19, at 220-21 ("[T]he Court did not define bad faith discovery in
the context of parallel proceedings, and it did not establish a doctrinal test or describe a specific
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injected significant confusion into the law of parallel proceedings and has kept
later courts guessing on how to differentiate between a constitutional and
unconstitutional parallel proceeding."
D. Post Kordel-Different Approaches Emerge
Following Kordel's limited holding, 8 the lower courts lacked any
universally applicable standard for judging parallel proceedings. 79  Some
courts have interpreted Kordel narrowly as a directive for courts to find
parallel proceedings unconstitutional only when the government fails to satisfy
its duty to warn defendants of their constitutional rights.80 A contrasting
approach takes a more expansive view, which provides that government
misconduct generally may be sufficient to find a parallel proceeding
impermissible.
8 1
1. Due Process and the Government's Duty to Warn
a. The Fifth Amendment and the Duty to Warn Requirement
The common theme in many cases upholding parallel proceedings is that a
parallel proceeding is constitutionally permissible under the Fifth Amendment
if the government fulfilled its duty to wam the defendant of his constitutional
• 82
rights. For example, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Dresser
Industries, the D.C. Circuit examined a defendant's motion to enjoin both the
SEC and the DOJ from jointly investigating and subpoenaing the defendant's
documents. 83 Dresser Industries was under investigation by the SEC and the
DOJ for questionable foreign payments and inadequate disclosure of such
payments in accordance with applicable securities laws.84  The company
set of circumstances under which a parallel criminal proceeding could not gather evidence from
an agency civil proceeding."); cf Hunter, supra note 5, at 177 (arguing against a bright line test
for parallel proceedings because it would infringe on judicial discretion).
77. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 153 ("[T]he list ... left practitioners with many questions
regarding what other factual situations constituted 'special circumstances.').
78. See Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11 (holding that the Court was not presented with a due process
violation).
79. See United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (indicating
that neither the government nor the defendant could cite to "any controlling law . ..
distinguish[ing] a legitimate, parallel investigation from an improper one").
80. See infra Part I.D.1.a.
81. See infra Part I.D.1.b.
82. See Babich, supra note 19, at 757 (stating that Dresser and Kordel both involved
situations in which the defendants received notice).
83. SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Dresser, although not a
Supreme Court case, is considered the "seminal case" on DOJ and SEC parallel proceedings, and
has been frequently cited by subsequent courts examining DOJ-SEC parallel proceedings. See
Hunter, supra note 5, at 153-54 & n.26.
84. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1370.
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resisted an SEC subpoena on the grounds that the DOJ was also conducting a
federal grand jury investigation of the company's foreign payments. 85
The court examined the "special circumstances" listed in Korde86 and
discussed various factors that should be considered in determining whether to
delay one of the parallel proceedings. 87 The court held that it would not block
a parallel proceeding unless the agrieved party could demonstrate that its
rights were substantially prejudiced.8 On these facts, the Dresser court ruled
that the defendants failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice because the
government had not indicted the defendants, violated the defendants' Fifth
Amendment rights, or compelled the defendants to reveal the basis of their
defense. 89
The court in United States v. Teyibo, a 1995 case in the Southern District of
New York, also upheld a parallel proceeding because the defendant did not
suffer a Fifth Amendment violation. 90 In Teyibo, the defendant sought to
suppress evidence obtained by the SEC in a parallel civil proceeding on the
ground that the DOJ used the SEC investigation to obtain evidence for the
criminal proceeding. 91 The critical issue in the case was whether the SEC's
warning failed to meet the minimum requirements of constitutional due
process under the Fifth Amendment. 92  The court noted that while the
government may not compel or coerce incriminating testimony from the
defendant, 93 a defendant who is aware of his rights and voluntarily gives
85. Id.
86. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 157 (noting that Dresser did not fully explain the "special
circumstances," but provided an analysis that was helpful to subsequent courts).
87. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1376 (prescribing that intervention in a parallel proceeding is
justified where: (1) the parties' Fifth Amendment rights were violated; (2) the civil action was
used to expand criminal discovery beyond the scope of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(3) the basis of defendant's criminal defense is exposed; or (4) the parallel proceeding would
prejudice the criminal case in some other way); see also Hunter, supra note 5, at 154 (listing the
Dresser factors).
88. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1377 ("[W]e should not block parallel investigations by these
agencies in the absence of special circumstances in which the nature of the proceedings
demonstrably prejudices substantial rights of the investigated party or of the government.").
Dresser suggested that Kordel gave courts power to assess the particular circumstances of each
case and intervene where the court deems it necessary. See id. at 1375.
89. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1376. The court also noted that the defendants failed to show that
the government violated the limitations of discovery. Id.
90. United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that a
defendant does not suffer a due process violation if he has knowledge of a parallel investigation).
91. Id. at 855.
92. Id. (noting that Kordel allows prosecutors to use evidence acquired in a civil action
unless the defendant establishes that doing so would violate his constitutional or procedural
rights).
93. Id at 856-57 (maintaining that the defendant's failure to assert his constitutional
privileges provided him with no recourse to later complain that he was compelled or coerced to
abandon his rights).
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testimony or evidence has not suffered a Fifth Amendment violation.94 The
court held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was not offended because the government sufficiently warned
the defendant9 5 that information provided to the SEC would likely be released
to United States Attorneys.
96
In United States v. Mahaffy, the Eastern District of New York upheld a
parallel SEC-DOJ investigation when the defendant was aware of the
existence of the parallel proceeding. 97 The court found it significant that the
SEC's investigation was well underway before the DOJ considered the
• 981 I
defendant as a possible target for criminal violations. The court also found it
significant that the DOJ had not manipulated the SEC's investigation to gather
evidence. 99
b. The Fourth Amendment and Government Misconduct
The concept of government misconduct has arisen in parallel proceeding
situations involving Fourth Amendment concerns with unreasonable search
and seizure. For example, in United States v. Tweel, a Fifth Circuit decision,
the IRS audited the defendants at the request of the DOJ's Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section, a unit of the DOJ that only handles criminal
investigations.100  The court noted that the defendants submitted self-
incriminating records under the mistaken belief that they were only being
subjected to a civil audit.1 ' While the court agreed that the IRS was under no
duty to warn defendants that the audit may lead to a criminal investigation,
10 2
94. Id. at 856 ("'[In the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes
disclosures instead of claiming the [Fifth Amendment] privilege, the Government has not
"compelled" him to incriminate himself."' (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654
(1976)) (alteration in original)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 850. The SEC provided the defendant with SEC Form 1662, which stated in
relevant part: "The [SEC] often makes its files available to other governmental agencies,
particularly United States Attorneys and state prosecutors. There is a likelihood that information
supplied by you will be made available to such agencies where appropriate." Id.
97. United States v. Mahaffy, 446 F. Supp. 115, 118-19 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the
defendant's attorney admitted knowing that both the SEC and the DOJ were investigating the
defendant).
98. Id. at 126 (noting that the SEC issued a testimonial subpoena months before the DOJ
indicated to the SEC that the defendant was a possible target of a criminal investigation).
99. Id ("There are no facts to suggest that the [United States Attorney's Office] hid behind
or manipulated the S.E.C. [sic] with the intention of misrepresenting its true intentions to the
defendants.").
100. United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 298 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1977).
101. Id. at 298.
102. Id. at 299 ("'We conclude that the mere failure of a revenue agent (be he regular or
special) to warn the taxpayer that the investigation may result in criminal charges, absent any acts
by the agent which materially misrepresent the nature of the inquiry, do not constitute fraud,
deceit and trickery. Therefore, the record here must disclose some affirmative misrepresentation
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the court held that the IRS violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights10 3 when the agency failed to inform the defendants that the investigation
was being conducted at the request of the DOJ criminal investigators.
1°4
The Fifth Circuit used a Fourth Amendment analysis again to reach a similar
conclusion in Securities and Exchange Commission v. ESM Government
Securities, Inc.10 5  In ESM, an SEC investigator misled the defendant into
believing that the SEC was investigating another firm in the building and was
merely conducting a routine audit of ESM.10 6 Upon realizing that the SEC
was, in fact, investigating ESM, the defendant ceased cooperation and the SEC
then issued a subpoena.'°7 Though ESM did not involve a parallel criminal
proceeding, 1 8 the court drew on Tweel in concluding that the failure to inform
the defendant was tantamount to deception. 0 9 The court determined that the
SEC engaged in "sneaky deliberate deception" by failing to inform the
defendant of the true nature of the investigation.] As a result, the court
denied enforcement of the subpoena."1
to establish the existence of fraud, and the showing must be clear and convincing."' (quoting
United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1033 (5th Cir. 1970))).
103. U.S. CONST. amend IV (protecting individuals against unreasonable search and seizure).
104. See Tweel, 214 F. Supp. at 299 ("It is a well established rule that a consent search is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the consent was induced by the deceit, trickery or
misrepresentation of the Internal Revenue agent.").
105. SEC v. ESM Gov't Secs., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 317 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) ("An
agency subpoena must conform to certain fourth amendment [sic] requirements ....").
106. See id. at 311. The SEC investigator told the defendant that he was "in the building
investigating another ... firm," requested a tour of defendant's offices, and subsequently returned
with SEC investigators without informing the defendant that the SEC had initiated an
investigation. Id.
107. Id. at312.
108. This case does not fit the classic parallel proceeding paradigm because it only involves
the SEC, but it has been cited in discussions of parallel proceedings. See Staton & Scatena, supra
note 7, at 19 (noting that ESM provided a definition of good faith).
109. ESM, 645 F.2d at 315. Much like ESM, Tweel involved the use of government
deception to obtain financial information that the defendant would not otherwise have released.
See Tweel, 550 F.2d at 298-99.
110. See ESM, 645 F.2d at 315-16 (quoting Tweel, 550 F.2d at 299-300).
111. Id at 317. The court emphasized that this was an instance when judicial discretion
empowered the court to intervene. See id. at 314 (discussing that although the Supreme Court has
not addressed the exact circumstances before the court, the federal judiciary is not "powerless to
structure relief when necessary"); accord Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1202
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing the Dresser court's interpretation that Kordel's judicial flexibility
permits courts to make determinations on a case-by-case basis). In Afro-Lecon, the court
explained that the Constitution does not require judicial intervention in parallel proceedings, but
that the Supreme Court implicitly left the court an option to intervene when there is evidence of
"malicious prosecution, the absence of counsel for defendant during depositions, agency bad
faith, malicious government tactics, and 'other special circumstances."' Afro-Lecon, 820 F.2d at
1202 (quoting United States v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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2. A Split Over the Government's Constitutional Obligations
Although the Fourth and Fifth Amendments prescribe certain limits on
government conduct in a parallel proceeding, the law on parallel proceedings
remains unclear on the issue of whether misconduct can be a stand-alone basis
.- 112
for invalidating a parallel proceeding. In United States v. Luce, a 2006
decision from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, the court rejected the notion that government misconduct during the
course of a DOJ-SEC parallel proceeding can amount to a due process
violation.1 3 At nearly the same time, two prominent DOJ-SEC district court
cases, 114 United States v. Scrushy and United States v. Stringer, dismissed
parallel criminal investigations based on what the court viewed as government
misconduct.' 15  The Ninth Circuit recently reversed Stringer,116 however, it
112. Compare United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1089 (D. Or. 2006), rev'd,
521 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissing a parallel criminal indictment where government
conduct was "grossly shocking and ... outrageous"), and United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp.
2d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (describing the government's behavior as "cloak and dagger
activities"), with United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1424 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[T]here is no
authority in this circuit which holds that the government's conduct in inducing the commission of
a crime, if 'outrageous' enough, can bar prosecution of an otherwise predisposed defendant under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."), and United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241
(7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]here are intimations that 'outrageous governmental misconduct' is an
independent ground for ordering a new trial in a federal criminal case; but we agree with the First
Circuit that 'the doctrine [of outrageous governmental misconduct] is moribund."' (quoting
United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993))). The First Circuit has also expressed
skepticism over the doctrine of prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1993) (criticizing the doctrine of outrageous governmental misconduct and noting that
"courts have rejected its application with almost monotonous regularity").
113. United States v. Luce, No. 05 CR 340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76052, at *17 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 29, 2006).
114. See Press Release, SEC Charges Health South Corp. CEO Richard Scrushy with $1.4
Billion Accounting Fraud (March 19, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-
34.htm, in which it was reported that the SEC charged Richard Scrushy, CEO of Health South,
with accounting fraud totaling $1.4 billion dollars. In its release, the SEC commended the
"excellent coordination and cooperation that has become the hallmark of efforts by the
Commission and the Department of Justice to combat financial fraud." Id In addition, there was
much publicity generated by the decision in Stringer as it was seen as new precedent that could
change significantly how courts evaluate DOJ and SEC coordination. See, e.g., Peter Lattman &
Kara Scannell, Slapping Down a Dynamic Duo, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2006, at CI; Lee Dunst,
The Future of Parallel Criminal-Civil Investigations: Business as Usual or Increased Judicial
Oversight?, WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT, Mar. 17, 2006, at 1, available at http://media.
gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubsWhiteCollar-3.17.2006-LDunst.pdf.
115. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-90; Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1140; accord Ewing,
supra note 19, at 226 ("Departing from recent precedent, the holdings in Scrushy and Stringer
encroached upon the authority of duly enacted federal laws and the policy choices of elected
officials by limiting the circumstances under which the SEC may share information with DOJ.").
116. United States v. Stringer, 521 F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 2008).
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stopped short of stating that government misconduct may never be grounds for
dismissal of a parallel proceeding.'
17
a. Misconduct is an Insufficient Basis for Finding Parallel Proceedings
Unconstitutional
The First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have criticized the theory that
government misconduct is a defense in criminal cases.1 18  The Sixth and
Seventh Circuits rejected specifically the argument that government
misconduct can be used as a defense, 119 and, as discussed below, a federal
district court in the Seventh Circuit expressly refused to intervene in parallel
proceedings based solely on the prosecution's conduct.
20
In a 1994 opinion out of the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Tucker, the court
emphatically rejected the theory that government misconduct could be an
independent basis for a due process violation. 121 Though not a parallel
proceeding, Tucker established a theoretical framework for parallel
proceedings, which subsequent courts could apply. 122  The Tucker court
asserted that although the execution of federal laws is an executive branch
power, it is "'subject to applicable constitutional and statutory limitations and
117. See Stringer, 521 F.3d at 1198 (acknowledging that "trickery or deceit" may be grounds
for finding a search unconstitutional). But the court went on to find that "[tlhe SEC engaged in
no tricks to deceive defendants into believing that the civil investigation was exclusively civil in
nature." Id. at 1199.
118. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Tucker, 28
F.3d 1420, 1424 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1993). But see
United States v. Ott, 489 F.2d 872, 873 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct in
the courtroom in the form of material misstatements at trial may be grounds for reversal).
119. See Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241; Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1424.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Luce, No. 05 CR 340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76052, at *18-
19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2006) (holding that absent a constitutional violation, the courts will not
intervene). The Eastern District of New York recently reached a similar conclusion in United
States v. Mahaffy, when the defendants sought to suppress evidence on the grounds that the
government used abusive tactics. 446 F. Supp. 2d 115, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The court did not
find the government's tactics so abusive as to violate the universal sense ofjustice. Id.
121. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1424, 1426-27.
122. Id. at 1427. Tucker reviewed whether a police sting operation violated a defendant's
due process rights. Id. at 1421. The defendant in Tucker argued that his indictment should be
dismissed because the government's conduct during the police sting was objectively outrageous
to the point of being a due process violation. Id. at 1422 ("Defendants argue that this court may,
indeed must, undertake an independent, objective assessment of the government's methods in this
case and, if we find them to be 'outrageous,' affirm the district court's decision to dismiss.").
Tucker noted that the Supreme Court had cautioned the lower courts against dismissing a
prosecution based on what a court might view as overzealous or outrageous law enforcement. Id.
at 1422-23 (noting that the authority to determine which crimes should be prosecuted lies not
with the judicial branch, but with the executive branch (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 435 (1973))). The Sixth Circuit had previously declined to use supervisory authority to
dismiss an indictment because the court said that absent a constitutional violation, the court's
intervention would amount to an unwarranted use of judicial power. Id. at 1424 (citing United
States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244, 247 (6th Cir. 1977)).
[Vol. 58:199
2008] The Case for Abolishing the Government Misconduct Test 217
to judicially fashioned rules to enforce those limitations." 23 Tucker proposed
that a defendant's due process rights are infringed only when the government
violates a specific constitutionally protected right.' 24 Under this approach, the
government's conduct may only rise to the level of a due process violation
when it infringes on an independent constitutional right of the defendant, not
simply because the conduct appears unseemly.
25
In 2006, in United States v. Luce, the United States Court for the Northern
District of Illinois applied reasoning similar to Tucker's to a parallel
proceeding for the first time. 126  In Luce, the defendant's records were
subpoenaed by a grand jury and later subpoenaed for an SEC investigation.! 27
After disclosing the records, the defendant testified at an SEC administrative
hearing without claiming a Fifth Amendment privilege.128 Upon receiving an
indictment, the defendant claimed that the SEC improperly used the civil
proceeding to gather evidence used in the indictment. 29 The defendant alleged
that the government violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination because he did not know that he was the target of a criminal
investigation. 130  Alternatively, the defendant argued that the government's
misconduct alone was a sufficient basis for finding a due process violation.'
3
'
While acknowledging that some courts accept government misconduct as a
defense to liability, 132 the Luce court stated that the Seventh Circuit has
123. Id. at 1423 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)). In Russell, the
court explained the division of responsibilities between the executive branch and the courts:
The execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the
Executive Branch of the Government, subject to applicable constitutional and statutory
limitations and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce those limitations. We think that
the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case quite unnecessarily introduces an
unmanageably subjective standard ....
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). Tucker explained further that the Supreme
Court has determined that the outrageous conduct approach fails to strike the proper balance
between the government's right to convict criminals and the desire to curb the government's
abuse tactics. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1428.
124. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1426-27.
125. Id. at 1427. The proper remedy for government misconduct is not to free the equally
culpable defendant by dismissing the criminal case, but to punish the government for its own
wrongdoing. Id. at 1423. The court explained that "'[iff police engage in illegal activity in
concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the
equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the [government]."' Id (quoting Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976)) (emphasis omitted).
126. United States v. Luce, No. 05 CR 340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76052, at *17 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 29, 2006).
127. Id. at*l13-14.
128. Id. at*15.
129. Id.
130. Id. at * 16.
131. Id. at *18.
132. Id. at * 18 (acknowledging, but later rejecting, the reasoning in Stringer and Scrushy).
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soundly rejected this theory as an independent basis for court intervention.'3 3
The court found that the defendant was not unaware of the criminal
proceeding. 134  More importantly, the court explained that in the Seventh
Circuit, government misconduct is an insufficient basis for a due process
violation. 135 The court noted that courts may consider governmental conduct
as evidence to establish an underlying constitutional violation, but misconduct
alone is not prima facie evidence of a due process violation.'
36
b. Judicial Discretion Used to Police Government Misconduct
Contrary to Tucker and Luce, district and appellate courts in the Federal,
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted an expansive view of due
process that includes government misconduct as an independent basis for
unconstitutionality. 137 These courts argue that Kordel permits broad judicial
discretion in determining whether a parallel proceeding is constitutionally
impermissible. 38  Specifically, the courts find that they are justified in
dismissing or intervening in a parallel proceeding where government conduct
is so shocking or abusive as to amount to an improper administration of
justice. 139
133. Id.
134. Id. at *16-17 (stating that the defendant "had received notice that he may be ... the
subject of a criminal investigation when he was served with the grand jury's subpoena" and that
SEC form 1622 "specifically advised [the defendant] that his testimony may be shared with
federal prosecutors").
135. Id. at * 18. The Luce court added that that the conduct of the prosecutor or government
is not wholly irrelevant, for there would have been a basis for dismissal had the government's
conduct violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at * 18-19.
136. See id. at *18-19 (explaining that the government's misconduct may support an
inference of a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right, but misconduct alone does not
compel the conclusion that a defendant's Fifth Amendment right was violated). Drawing on
authority from the Seventh Circuit, the Luce court stated that "misconduct may precipitate a
reversible error, but it is never in itselfa reversible error." Id. (quoting United States v. Boyd, 55
F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995)).
137. See, e.g., Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1987); SEC
v. ESM Gov't Secs., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981); United States v.
Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (D. Or. 2006), rev'd, 521 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2005); see also David A. Garcia &
Ralph C. Ferrara, Meeting in Dark Corners and Strange Places: Scheming Between the SEC and
the Department of Justice, 38 SEC. REG. & L. 1329, 1332 (2006) (discussing that federal courts
will intervene in parallel proceedings for government misconduct if the government abuses civil
discovery for the benefit of collecting evidence for an indictment); Jason Schulze, Note, United
States v. Tucker: Can the Sixth Circuit Really Abolish Outrageous Government Conduct Defense,
45 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 957 (1996).
138. See United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
139. See Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39 (comparing the government's conduct with the
conduct at issue in Parrott I and suggesting that the similarities establish that the government's
conduct departed from the proper administration of criminal justice); see also Stringer, 408 F.
Supp. 2d at 1088 (holding that the government abused the standards of criminal justice by
secretly conducting a criminal investigation while the civil investigation was ongoing).
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United States v. Scrushy, a high profile 140 case in the Northern District of
Alabama, examined the defendant's argument that the DOJ prosecutors
improperly used an SEC enforcement action to gather evidence for its criminal
indictment.141  The court determined that, according to Parrott 1,142 proper
administration of justice requires that a defendant know about the criminal
investigation. 143 While the government did not lie to the defendant about the
existence of a criminal investigation, 144 the court stated that the commingling
145of the investigations was clear evidence of impropriety. Therefore, Scrushy
held that the government compromised the integrity of the criminal justice
system by allowing the DOJ and the SEC to work so closely 146 and by failing
to explicitly warn about the status of the criminal investigation.
147
In 2006, just one year after Scrushy, the court in United States v. Stringer
dismissed a criminal case because the government failed to disclose the
existence of a parallel criminal investigation. 148  The Federal District of
Oregon found that the government concealed its intention to initiate a criminal
prosecution,1 49 delayed its criminal case to allow the civil proceedings to
140. See Carrie Johnson, Scrushy Jury Still Uncertain: Complex Fraud Charges Prolong
Deliberations, WASH. POST, May 27, 2005, at El (describing that the prosecution of Health South
executive Richard Scrushy was the first high profile case under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and that
it illustrated the challenge for the prosecution in keeping a complex case simple).
141. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (noting that while the civil proceeding was ongoing,
the SEC discussed the existence of a criminal investigation with the United States Attorney's
Office but did not alert the defendant or his attorneys of this fact when the SEC deposed
defendant).
142. Id. at 1139. The court embraced Parrott I after deciding that it could identify no
controlling case law. Id. at 1137-38 ("The question to which neither side could cite any
controlling law is what distinguishes a legitimate parallel proceeding from an improper one. The
court could find no controlling authority on this critical point.").
143. Id. at 1139.
144. Id. at 1140.
145. See Ewing, supra note 19, at 223 ("[The court] concluded that the SEC's standard form
of notice had, in light of extensive interagency cooperation, departed from the proper
administration of justice."). In Scrushy, the court looked unfavorably on the extensive
communication between the United States Attorneys and SEC civil attorney. 366 F. Supp. 2d at
1138 (observing that the government "had both notice and direct input" on the U.S. Attorney's
Office strategy for deposing the defendant). Furthermore, the court recited that United States
Attorneys had directed the SEC civil attorneys to "keep [the defendant] in the dark regarding the
criminal investigation" and caused the SEC to include questions in their depositions that the
agency would not have otherwise included. Id
146. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 ("This commingling . . . negated the existence of
parallel investigations.").
147. Id. (The district court acknowledged that the government "did not outright lie," but
refused to limit its authority to intervene only to cases involving actual deceit. Instead, the court
took an expansive view that bad faith may also be grounds for judicial remedy.).
148. United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088 (D. Or. 2006), rev'd, 521 F.3d
1189 (9th Cir. 2008).
149. Id. at 1088-89 (finding the government's answer to defendants' question about the
existence of a parallel criminal investigation particularly misleading given the extent of
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divulge evidence,1 50 and provided the defendants insufficient warning. 151
Based on these findings, the Stringer court held that the defendants' due
process rights were violated because the government's tactics were 'so
grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense ofjustice.'''152 It also held that the government violated the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights by involving the DOJ in the investigation without notifying
the defendant.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Stringer
on three critical points. 154 First, the court held that the government had not
engaged in trickery or deceit because the government had no legal duty to
further disclose the existence of the parallel criminal investigation.
155
Reversing the district court, the circuit court held that the government was only
required to provide the defendants with "'sufficient notice . . . that any
information could be used against [them] in a subsequent criminal
proceeding." '156  Second, and contrary to the district court, the circuit court
found that the SEC's investigation was a "bona fide civil investigation," rather
than "a pretext for the ... criminal investigation."' 57 Third, the Ninth Circuit
held that the defendants may state a claim under the Fourth Amendment if they
can show that the government used trickery or deceit to induce the defendants
to divulge evidence. 158 However, the court went on to clarify that the true test
of a Fourth Amendment violation is whether the government made affirmative
coordination between the SEC and the United States Attorney). The court recited that
defendants' counsel asked the SEC attorney "whether... the SEC is working in conjunction with
any other department of the United States, such as the U.S. Attorney's Office in any jurisdiction,
or the Department of Justice." Id. at 1087. The SEC attorney referred the defendants' counsel to
Form 1662 and said that "it is the agency's policy not to respond to questions like that, but
instead, to direct you to the other agencies you mentioned." Id.
150. Id. at 1088 (stating that the United States Attorney delayed revealing his intent to
prosecute to defendant for almost a year after the start of the SEC investigation even though from
the beginning the United States Attorney viewed a criminal prosecution as likely).
151. Id. at 1088 (finding the standard SEC Form 1662 notice was insufficient in light of the
fact that the defendants were identified by the DOJ as potential targets early in the investigation).
The court rejected the government's argument that it provided the defendant "with adequate
notice that their statements could be used in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 1087-88.
152. Id. at 1089 (quoting United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991)). The
court also described the government's conduct as "deceit and trickery." Id.
153. Id. at 1089-90 (noting that it would be unfair to penalize a defendant for failing to
invoke his Fifth Amendment right when the defendant was not "on guard against incriminating
[himself]" (quoting United States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (N.D. Ohio 1970))).
154. United States v. Stringer, 521 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2008).
155. Id. at 1197 (holding that the defendants were sufficiently apprised of their constitutional
rights once the SEC had provided the defendants with Form 1662).
156. Id. (quoting United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)) (alteration
in original).
157. Id. at 1198.
158. Id.
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misrepresentations to the defendant. 159  Because the SEC gave no false or
misleading responses to the defendants, the court held that defendants failed to
state Fourth Amendment violations.'
60
1I. RETURNING TO THE BASICS: THE DUE PROCESS TEST
A. The Importance of the Duty to Warn
The due process test provided in Kordel was fundamentally sound, but did
not fully explain the significance of a warning or what qualifies as an adequate
warning.1 61  As illustrated above, the duty to warn is the defining factor in
considering whether a parallel proceeding is unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment.' 62 This section analyzes what constitutes an adequate warning
and why a warning is a critical factor in examining a parallel proceeding.
The Kordel Court correctly identified that due process requires that a
defendant receive sufficient warning of a parallel proceeding.1 63 Missing from
the Court's holding is an explanation of what makes a warning constitutionally
adequate. 164  The Court's holding should be understood as a minimal
requirement, mandating that the government simply warn a defendant that his
disclosures could be used in a criminal prosecution.' 65 When such a warning is
given, then the defendant has the choice of whether or not to invoke his
constitutional rights.
166
Subsequent lower court decisions, particularly Teyibo and the Stringer
appellate court decision, support the view that an adequate warning need only
inform a defendant of his rights and the possible ramifications of disclosure.
167
159. Id. at 1198-99.
160. Id. at 1198-2000.
161. See Babich, supra note 19, at 753 (stating that the Supreme Court has failed to clarify
how Kordel should be applied).
162. See supra Part I.D.1.
163. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 4 (1970) (noting that the FDA satisfied its
statutory requirements). Here the adequate warning was statutorily prescribed, mandated by an
FDA statute:
Before any violation of [the Act] is reported by the Secretary [of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare] to any United States attorney for institution of a
criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding is contemplated shall be
given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his views, either orally or in
writing, with regard to such contemplated proceeding.
21 U.S.C. § 335 (2000); cf Ewing, supra note 19, at 226 ("Current SEC policy sufficiently
protects the constitutional rights of those involved in civil enforcement proceedings.").
164. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 5 (affirming a district court ruling that reasoned that the FDA's
warning was adequate even though it "did not conclusively indicate the government would
institute a criminal proceeding").
165. See Ewing, supra note 19, at 220.
166. Id.
167. See United States v. Stringer, 521 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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SEC Form 1662, received by the defendants in Teyibo and Stringer, informed
the defendants that they may refuse to make disclosures based on their Fifth
Amendment privilege and that any information provided to the SEC would
likely be transmitted to the U.S. Attorney's Office. 168 As Form 1662 makes
clear, whether the SEC actually chooses to share information gathered in a
parallel proceeding is confidential information unavailable to the defendant.
1 69
The adequacy of a warning must also be judged against any statutory
mandate placed on the agency that would elevate the warning requirements
beyond basic due process. As Kordel illustrates, the FDA was required under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to serve the defendant with notice
specifying that the agency contemplated initiating a criminal proceeding
relating to the same matter at issue in the civil enforcement action. 7 It would
be inappropriate to equate the same statutorily imposed warning as in Kordel
on the SEC, for example, because the SEC has adopted a different form of
warning provided by SEC Form 1662.'
To hold that the notice requirement goes beyond a duty to inform the
defendant of his constitutional or statutory rights would be to place an undue
burden on the government to constantly update a defendant about the
government's plans to proceed with a criminal action. 173 Whereas the district
courts in Stringer and Scrushy adopted the requirement of a heightened
warning, 174 these decisions confused the government's duty to warn with
168. Stringer, 521 F.3d at 1197; Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. at 856. SEC Form 1662 contains a
section describing the routine uses of information gathered by the SEC: "The Commission often
makes its files available to other governmental agencies, particularly United States Attorneys and
state prosecutors. There is a likelihood that information supplied by you will be made available
to such agencies where appropriate." SEC Form 1662, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/
forms/sec 1662.pdf.
169. See id. ("Whether or not the Commission makes its files available to other governmental
agencies is, in general, a confidential matter between the Commission and such other
governmental agencies.").
170. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 4 (1970).
171. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 40-41, United States v. Stringer, No. 06-30100 (9th
Cir. Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Brief for the United States] (arguing that unlike Kordel, where the
government had a statutory duty to warn, the SEC has no similar notification requirement because
of its use of Form 1662).
172. See Babich, supra note 19, at 780 (arguing that "defendants should have access to
communications between investigative agencies when there is a concern that a defendant has been
fraudulently lulled into cooperation with a civil proceeding").
173. United States v. Parrott (Parrott I1), 315 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (noting
that keeping a defendant constantly updated on the direction of the criminal investigation would
be unrealistic, burdensome, and even useless to the defendant (quoting United States v. Scalfani,
265 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1959))).
174. Ewing, supra note 19, at 225 (noting that Stringer and Scrushy misconstrued Kordel by
requiring that the DOJ and the SEC refrain from cooperation when the DOJ intends to prosecute,
whereas Kordel only mandated that civil proceedings must not be brought "solely" to obtain
evidence).
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issues of affirmative misrepresentation by the government.1 75 By concluding
that insufficient warning was tantamount to a false statement, the district
courts in Stringer and Scrushy mistakenly articulated a rule for warning that
was higher than basic due process and contrary to the statutory
requirements.177  By contrast, the Stringer Ninth Circuit decision properly
explained that Kordel draws the line so that statements by the government
would only be improper if those statements prevented the defendant from
knowing or exercising his constitutional rights.1
78
B. Flaws in the Government Misconduct Test
Although some courts have stated that government misconduct during a
parallel proceeding can be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, 7 9 these cases
do not support the theory that the government's failure to warn a defendant is
sufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.18  As explained by the
Ninth Circuit in Stringer, the Fourth Amendment is only violated if the
government makes affirmative misrepresentations.18
General allegations of government trickery or deceit are insufficient to
trigger a Fourth Amendment violation. 182 In addition, as explained in Stringer,
the government's omission or failure to answer questions cannot be labeled as
affirmative misrepresentations. 183  Because a Fourth Amendment violation
requires an affirmative misrepresentation and the failure to warn a defendant of
a parallel investigation is merely an omission-not an affirmative
misrepresentation-a mere failure to warn a defendant does not amount to a
Fourth Amendment violation.' 
8 4
175. Id. (noting that neither Stringer or Scrushy cited a case in which "the government's
failure to inform (as opposed to making a false statement) was the sole basis for deeming a
parallel proceeding improper").
176. Id. ("The holding[s] in Stringer and Scrushy also blurred an important distinction in the
case law between the government's false statements to defendants and the government's failure to
inform a civil defendant of probable prosecution.").
177. See id at 225-26.
178. See United States v. Stringer, 521 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he SEC made no
affirmative misrepresentations [and] engaged in no tricks to deceive defendants into believing
that the investigation was exclusively civil in nature."); see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S.
1, 11-12 (1970) (discussing that this was not a case in which the government has "failed to advise
the defendant in its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution"); United States
v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 856-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no coercion by the government
that would have prevented defendant from asserting his Fifth Amendment rights).
179. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text (discussing that both Tweel and ESM
dealt with situations in which government agents not only failed to warn but also misrepresented
the nature of their investigation).
181. Stringer, 521 F.3d at 1198-99.
182. See id. at 1199.
183. Id. at 1198-99.
184. Id. at 1199-1200.
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Nor is government misconduct necessarily a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Courts in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have taken the approach
that government misconduct can be relevant as evidence of a due process
violation, but does not compel such an inference.1 85 This approach is helpful
for several reasons. First, this approach helps focus the court's attention on the
defendant's rights and whether those rights have been violated. 186 Second, this
approach does not foreclose a defendant from challenging the government's
conduct, but requires that the defendant ultimately link the alleged misconduct
to a violation of some discernible right.187 Third, this approach adheres to the
requirements Congress prescribed for federal criminal offenses.' 88 Finally, the
jury remains the ultimate backstop against arbitrary law enforcement because
the defendant may ultimately argue before the jury about law enforcement's
corruption or overzealousness.1
89
Importantly, the Supreme Court has not established authority for the federal
courts to dismiss a parallel criminal investigation based solely on government
misconduct. 190 The Kordel Court's dictum that dismissal may be proper where
the defendant establishes a departure from the administration of justice 191 has
erroneously been interpreted as an approval of the government misconduct
approach. 192 This interpretation takes Kordel's holding out of context, for as
185. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995).
186. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (providing that a due
process defense is available only when the Government violates an identifiable right of the
defendant).
187. See United States v. Luce, No. 05 CR 340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76052, at *18-19
(N.D. I11. Sept. 29, 2006) (indicating that governmental misconduct may "precipitate a reversible
error, but it is never in itself a reversible error"); see also Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241 ("The gravity of
the prosecutors' misconduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the materiality of the
infringement of the defendants' rights .... ").
188. See United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1428 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that when
none of the defendant's rights have been violated, the court must keep its focus on whether the
elements of the offense, as provided by Congress, are met).
189. See id. (providing that both Congress and the Supreme Court have drawn the line to
ensure that the jury may be the ultimate defense against misconduct by law enforcement (citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968))).
190. See id. ("[T]here is no binding Supreme Court authority recognizing a defense based
solely upon an objective assessment of the government's conduct .... "); United States v. Teyibo,
877 F. Supp. 846, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that the government may use evidence
acquired in a civil action "unless the defendant demonstrates that such use would violate his
constitutional rights or depart from the proper administration of criminal justice").
191. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970).
192. See United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088 (D. Or. 2006), rev'd, 521 F.3d
1189 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that government's conduct clearly falls within the category of
improper administration of justice); see also Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198,
1202 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that the court may stay a parallel proceeding based on "agency bad
faith, malicious government tactics, and 'other special circumstances"'); United States v. Scrushy,
366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (characterizing the government's civil and criminal
investigations as improperly coordinated).
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Teyibo illustrates, improper administration of justice deals with situations
where a defendant's rights were violated because he was coerced or
intimidated into testifying.' 93  Therefore, improper administration of justice
only comes into play when a defendant has not been informed of the possibility
of a parallel proceeding and the consequences of disclosures.
94
There are courts, such as the district courts in Stringer and Scrushy, that
argue that misconduct itself may be a due process violation when it is
egregious enough. 95 While it may be difficult to draw a sharp line defining a
due process violation, 196 dismissal based on government misconduct is
reserved for only the most severe and shocking behavior.1 97 Also telling is that
very few cases have found such extreme violations. 98 This suggests that
government misconduct is not a well-established basis for dismissing a parallel
proceeding.
Dismissal of a parallel proceeding for government misconduct is also
inconsistent with the notion that the use of supervisory powers is the
exception' 99 and that courts should be reluctant to become involved absent "a
clear basis in fact and law." 200 Based on historical origins, the courts' use of
193. See Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. at 857 (finding no evidence that defendant was coerced); see
also Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, supra note 8, at 1282-83 (describing that the
defendant is a victim of fundamental unfairness where a judge is interested in a trial's outcome,
publicity prevents an impartial jury, or the prosecution uses false and misleading evidence).
194. See United States v. Stringer, 521 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no
affirmative misrepresentations by the SEC); Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. at 857 (noting that the
defendant was notified of his rights and understood their implications).
195. See, e.g., Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (stating that dismissal of the criminal
proceeding was justified given that the "government engaged in deceit and trickery"); Scrushy,
366 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (endorsing court intervention where the court finds an improper
administration of criminal justice).
196. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) (explaining that due
process should not be viewed as a technical concept, but courts "must discover what 'fundamental
fairness' consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then
by assessing the several interests that are at stake").
197. See, e.g., United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing that the
standard for dismissal based on a due process violation is met when the government "'engineer[s]
and directs a criminal enterprise from start to finish' (quoting United States v. So, 755 F.2d
1350, 1353 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)
(barring prosecution pursuant to due process requirements "'only when the government's conduct
is so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice,"' such as
when the government engages in actual illegal behavior over an extended period of time (quoting
United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983))).
198. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 171; Eckers, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that concrete
examples of circumstances egregious enough to amount to an unconstitutional parallel proceeding
are "few and far between"); Schulze, supra note 137, at 957 (noting that claims of outrageous
government conduct are rarely successful).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983) (directing courts to use
narrowly tailored remedies to deter governmental misconduct); Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 542 (calling
for supervisory authority only when there is a clear basis in law).
200. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 542 (9th Cir. 1983).
Catholic University Law Review
supervisory authority is most appropriate to govern conduct within the
courtroom.20  This means that the courts' supervisory authority does not
extend to conduct outside the courtroom unless there is a constitutional or
statutory violation.
202
To read Kordel as a license to critique government coordination more
broadly without some connection to a defendant's constitutional rights is a
mistake, because many federal agencies are expressly encouraged to cooperate
with one another.20 3  Kordel and Dresser provided that the public interest
favors increased coordination between the civil and criminal investigations to
effectively enforce federal laws. 20 4 The Kordel Court was reticent to interfere
with prosecutorial discretion 205 and courts have been particularly mindful of
congressional approval of interagency coordination in law enforcement.
206
Given prosecutorial discretion and the policy of sharing information among
agencies, dismissing a case based solely on government coordination affords
courts overly broad discretion and overlooks congressional intent.
207
201. See supra notes 30-32.
202. See United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
supervisory powers may be used to supervise a court's affairs, but not to police conduct outside of
the courtroom, as the "supervisory power comprehends authority for the courts to supervise their
own affairs, not the affairs of the other branches").
203. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (providing that the
relevant statutes, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, evidence
express authority for the SEC to transmit evidence to the DOJ and that there is "no limitation on
when this transmittal may occur"); United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1978)
("[T]he procedure permitting preliminary communications with the United States Attorney has
significant advantages. Allowing early participation in the case by the United States Attorney
minimizes statute of limitations problems. The more time a United States Attorney has, the easier
it is for him to become familiar with the complex facts of a securities fraud case, to prepare the
case, and to present it to a grand jury before expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
Earlier initiation of criminal proceedings moreover is consistent with a defendant's right to a
speedy trial."); see also Hunter, supra note 5, at 177 ("Allowing the SEC and the DOJ to freely
share evidence is appropriate, in light of the voluminous amount of evidence in the form of
paperwork that is common in actions regarding violations of the federal securities laws.").
204. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (discussing that the public policy in
protecting consumers was best served through prompt action by the agency charged with
enforcing federal food and drug laws); Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1377 ("Effective enforcement of the
securities laws requires that the SEC and Justice be able to investigate possible violations
simultaneously.").
205. Ewing, supra note 19, at 225 (noting that it would "invade prosecutorial discretion" to
permit judicial intervention based solely on interagency coordination).
206. See Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1385 (explaining that the Securities Act and the Securities and
Exchange Act expressly authorize the SEC to share and transmit information to the DOJ, and that
there is no limit on when the SEC may transmit such information); see also Brief for the United
States, supra note 171, at 33 ("Congress has determined that the proper administration of justice
includes a 'close working relationship' between civil and criminal authorities to maximize the
effectiveness of federal law.").
207. Cf Ewing, supra note 19, at 225 ("There is nothing in existing case law that would
require the Ninth Circuit or courts in other circuits to suppress evidence obtained in a DOJ/SEC
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Dismissing a parallel criminal proceeding based on government misconduct
is also flawed because it fails to consider whether the civil proceeding was
conducted for a legitimate, noncriminal purpose.20 8 Whether an agency has a
legitimate, noncriminal reason for its investigation is a critical factor. As
long as an agency has a legitimate, noncriminal purpose for conducting an
investigation, the court should not inquire further into the government's
reasons for bringing the statutorily authorized proceeding. 2  For this reason,
the government misconduct test is inappropriate because it permits courts to
dismiss criminal actions when the government has a legitimate, noncriminal
purpose.21
Finally, government misconduct alone is not a functional approach because
it gives no meaningful guidance for when disclosure of a criminal investigation
212
would be required. In fact, the government misconduct test could have the
distorted effect of requiring civil investigators to notify a defendant about the
possibility of a criminal prosecution even though it may hinder criminal
prosecution by alerting an investigatory target.213  Courts that consider
government misconduct fail to appreciate that other courts have expressed
reservations about labeling the conduct of another branch of government
214improper without any constitutional or statutory basis.
parallel proceeding solely on the basis of extensive interagency cooperation that was not revealed
to the civil defendant.").
208. See, e.g., United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no
due process violation as long as: 1) the SEC's investigation was genuine; 2) the SEC's
investigation began before the DOJ started the criminal investigation; 3) there was no substantive
consultation between the agencies; and 4) the SEC ultimately received judgment on the initial
action).
209. See Ewing, supra note 19, at 224 ("[W]hen the SEC could show that it might pursue
civil enforcement, the Commission's discovery process had never been halted merely because
DOJ would likely prosecute.").
210. See Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1387 ("A bad faith investigation, in the Court's conception, is
one conducted solely for criminal enforcement purposes. Where the agency has a legitimate
noncriminal purpose for the investigation, it acts in good faith . . . even if it might use the
information gained in the investigation for criminal enforcement purposes as well." (citations
omitted)).
211. See United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088-89 (D. Or. 2006), rev'd, 521
F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissing the criminal proceeding even though the SEC investigation
was a legitimate investigation of possible securities fraud).
212. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 13, United States v. Stringer, No. 06-30100 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2006).
213. Id. at 15-16 (arguing that the creation of a relative disclosure standard based on
government misconduct would "severely threaten the criminal authorities' investigatory
privileges . . . [because] [iun many cases criminal authorities legitimately do not want their
presence or interest known to potential ... targets").
214. See United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1422 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that it is a
"highly suspect" undertaking to determine whether the conduct of another "co-equal branch of
... government [is] either 'outrageous or not outrageous').
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III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A RIGHTS-BASED DUE PROCESS STANDARD
The confusion among the courts about the appropriate standard for parallel
proceedings has led to inconsistent rulings2 15 and created unpredictability and
uncertainty for both the government and defendants facing possible parallel
proceedings. 216  When presented with a claim that a parallel proceeding is
improper due to government misconduct, the federal courts should examine the
claim in relation to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.1 7
Under the Fourth Amendment prong, the court should determine whether the
government made affirmative misrepresentations in order to gain access to
evidence. 218 General allegations of trickery or deceit will not qualify as an
affirmative misrepresentation, 2 19 nor will evidence of the government's intent
to prevent disclosure of an actual criminal proceeding to a defendant. 220 The
defendant must establish that the government "'affirmatively [misled]' the
subject of parallel civil and criminal investigations 'into believing that the
investigation [was] exclusively civil in nature and [would] not lead to criminal
charges.'
221
Under the Fifth Amendment, the court's analysis should focus on whether
the defendant received an adequate warning, as measured against constitutional
and statutory requirements. The adequacy of a warning should first be
tested against any statutory requirements. As part of this process, the court
must consider the policy and intent of the legislation.224 If the court is satisfied
that the government provided an adequate warning, then the court should
presume that the parallel proceeding is constitutionally permissible unless the
defendant can establish other grounds for the unconstitutionality of a parallel
proceeding. Given that the courts have repeatedly acknowledged that parallel
proceedings are unobjectionable and that the government has the authority to
215. Compare Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. at 856 (holding that the SEC's standard warning is
sufficient notice), with Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1088 (holding that SEC's standard warning is
inadequate notice).
216. See Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (finding no controlling authority on parallel
proceedings).
217. See Stringer, 521 F.3d at 1196-1200 (reviewing the alleged improper parallel
proceeding under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). The court explained that "[o]ther
circuits have agreed that Fourth Amendment and possible due process limitations may be
implicated in a dual investigation." Id. at 1198.
218. See Stringer, 521 F.3d at 1199 (examining whether the government made affirmative
misstatements during its parallel proceeding).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1198 (quoting United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 18 (9th Cir. 1973)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
222. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (considering the parallel proceedings
proper given the FDA's warning). Therefore, this approach is consistent with Kordel.
223. Accord id at 4 (describing that the FDA satisfied its statutory warning requirement).
224. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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decide when to bring the parallel actions, 225 a proper burden-shifting scheme
would envision that the party alleging the violation has both the burdens of
production and persuasion as to evidence of a violation.226
Under the Fifth Amendment analysis, courts should adopt the approach that
government misconduct is not an independent basis for dismissal of a parallel
proceeding.227 Instead, dismissal of a parallel proceeding should be based on
violation of a specific constitutional right held by the defendant or a statutory
obligation placed on the government. 228  Because the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits have established that government misconduct alone cannot be a basis
for dismissal,229 the defendants must establish which right was allegedly
violated.230 The importance of identifying this right is supported by the fact
that the court's supervisory authority to intervene in parallel proceedings
should be used only when "there is a clear basis in fact and law for doing
so."'23' A specific violation of a defendant's rights provides a clear basis in
law.232  Following the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Boyd, the court may
properly consider the government's conduct insofar as the court uses such
evidence to establish the severity of the injury to a defendant's rights.233
Finally, the court will examine whether the government caused the harmful
234injury or prejudice. This provides the last essential link to ensure that the
harm was caused by the government, and is not a self-inflicted injury, as in
Kordel, when the defendant knowingly failed to assert his Fifth Amendment
225. See, e.g., id. at 1374 ("[P]arallel proceedings are unobjectionable under our
jurisprudence.").
226. See Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11 (indicating that the defendant bears the burden of
establishing the due process violation and that defendant failed to make out such a claim); see
also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (providing that the party alleging
the constitutional violation must carry the burden of persuasion).
227. See United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1424 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no
authority supporting the proposition that the outrageousness of the government's conduct,
standing alone, can warrant dismissal of a criminal action against a predisposed defendant).
228. See id. at 1427 (holding that government misconduct, no matter how outrageous, cannot
be a defense unless the defendant's constitutional right has been violated).
229. See supra notes 118-19.
230. United States v. Luce, No. 05 CR 340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76052, at *17 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 29, 2006).
231. See Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 541; United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir.
1982) (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977)).
232. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., plurality
opinion) ("The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play
only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the Defendant."
(emphasis added)).
233. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing considerations of
misconduct as one type of evidence to establish a due process violation).
234. See Kordel, 397 U.S. at 7 (providing no grounds for recourse when defendant
voluntarily incriminated himself).
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privilege against self-incrimination. 235 But this element of the test would be
satisfied, for example, where the government coerced a defendant to testify
against his will 236 or caused him to disclose information without knowledge of
his rights.
237
Applying this approach to the Kordel scheme would yield a more level and
predictable body of law for parallel proceedings. Under the first Kordel
circumstance, whether the government brought a civil action for legitimate
reasons, the government would clearly retain the right to exercise its
prosecutorial discretion as the Kordel Court envisioned. However, courts
would recognize that the government's discretion is limited by the defendant's
constitutional and statutory rights. 239 A violation of the defendant's procedural
rights would still be tantamount to a procedural due process violation, and thus
240
would give a defendant a valid defense against his prosecution.
Under the second Kordel circumstance, the issue of sufficient notification
would require the court to identify whether a defendant's right to a warning is241
founded on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or
whether a higher warning is specified by statute.242 Consequently, a defendant
would be entitled to assert a due process defense where the government failed
to carry out its duty to warn and thus triggered a procedural due process
violation.
243
Finally, the Kordel court's provision for special circumstances would be
more narrowly conceived as a subset of examples of due process violations.
244
While the conduct of the government on its own would not rise to the level of a
235. Id.
236. See United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
237. See id.
238. See Kordel, 397 U.S. at 1 (noting that the Court did not want to "stultify enforcement
of federal law" by requiring the government to choose between instituting criminal or civil
proceedings).
239. See supra notes 169-78.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
prosecutorial misconduct is relevant only in conjunction with an infringement of a defendant's
due process rights, thereby implying that due process concerns are always valid).
241. See Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. at 856 (providing that the Fifth Amendment afforded the
defendant the right to refuse to disclose self-incriminating information).
242. See Kordel, 397 U.S. at 4 & n.5 (discussing that the FDA had a statutory obligation to
warn defendant); see also United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 18 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that
an IRS audit agent conducting a civil audit was under no duty to inform defendant that the audit
could have criminal consequences).
243. See United States v. Parrott (Parrott 1), 248 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (finding
that IRS agents who were investigating for a civil proceeding had not informed defendant that a
criminal investigation was ongoing and that he was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment rights
(citing United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955))).
244. See Teyibo, 877 F. Supp at 855-56 (viewing the special circumstances in Kordel as
specific examples of due process violations).
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due process violation, the court would still play a key supervisory role in
ensuring that a defendant's constitutional rights are protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
Parallel proceedings are a proper exercise of the government's statutory
rights and a vital tool for enforcement of federal law in the public interest.
Defendants in parallel proceedings have protections that extend to the limits of
their constitutional rights, statutory rights, and their rights to proper procedure.
However, courts have greatly expanded the holding of Kordel by using judicial
discretion to police parallel proceedings. A more functional approach suggests
that the first critical question a court must address is whether a defendant
received an adequate warning. Where adequate warning is provided, the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating specific constitutional or statutory
grounds for intervention. Though courts will have less discretion than under
the district court decisions in Stringer or Scrushy, this revised approach will
ensure a fair balance between the rights of all parties in the course of parallel
proceedings.
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